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USING THE OPEN SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE TO 
UNDERSTAND CRITICAL INCIDENTS 
 




At the end of its Fall 2010 conference, the Academy for Critical Incident Analysis (ACIA) called 
for the development of frameworks that would aid in the study and analysis of critical incidents. 
This paper responds to that call. The paper answers the question, “is it possible to construct a 
framework that is generic enough to encapsulate the essential components observed in all critical 
incidents?” The paper utilizes the open systems perspective to develop a conceptual framework to 
help us delineate and understand critical incidents and how they evolve. The paper presents 
examples to substantiate arguments made about the framework.  The chief example relied on for 
this purpose is Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Open systems is a good candidate to help our 
understanding of critical incidents because like critical incidents an open system is one whose 
component parts are so interrelated and interdependent that any change in one component 
produces simultaneous changes in other components and so alter the thing as a whole. The open 
systems perspective helps us to focus on the dynamical nature of critical incidents. In addition, 
open systems perspective helps us to consider the fact that there is no simple cause and effect 
relationship in critical incidents, but that there are multiple relationships, and simultaneous 
consequences throughout the critical incident system. A notable insight gained from utilizing the 
proposed framework is that critical incidents are non-linear in that the components within the 
system interact everywhere within the system in a non-random and patterned way. Therefore 
utilizing a holistic approach to studying critical incidents is essential to understanding these 





This paper addresses the question: is it possible to develop a framework generic enough 
to encapsulate the essential components that can be observed in all critical incidents? The author 
believes that this question is pertinent to the study of critical incidents today as scholars grapple 
with how to advance the field beyond just the study of critical incident cases. Developing 
conceptual frameworks that can later be refined, tested and proven or disproved will facilitate 
critical incident analysis and ultimately theory development. Conceptual frameworks identify a 
set of variables and the relationships that account for a set of phenomena (Ostrom, 1996). A 
framework will help us to understand the key elements of critical incidents and the relationships 
between and among these elements. This is an important step in theory building. According to 
Ostrom (2005), frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive research from which 
hypotheses are generated; they ask specific questions and make working assumptions about 
important  elements  and relationships. Frameworks  also help us to show important relationships               
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and assist the testing of these relationships. The utility of using the systems perspective in 
developing this framework is that it moves away from the reductionist, cause-and-effect model to 
a more holistic, non-linear study of critical incidents. This is a more meaningful approach to 
analyzing critical incidents. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the methods used to develop the 
arguments for this paper. Section two presents the current definition and model-in-use of critical 
incidents and discusses the main ideas presented in them. Section three sketches the open 
systems perspective and discusses how it aids our understanding of critical incidents. Section 
four outlines the proposed framework, and discusses the key ideas and components of the 
framework using examples to elucidate arguments. Section five presents a series of steps that 




The author of this paper uses the proceedings of the Summer and Fall 2010 critical 
incidents conferences and the critical incident conference of Summer of 2011 to develop a 
general framework for critical incidence analysis (Academy for Critical Incident Analysis, 
2011a; 2011b’ 2011c). The Summer 2010 conference focused on a case assessment of Hurricane 
Katrina as a critical incident, with emphasis on the displaced persons involved. The conference 
highlighted the multiple dimensions of critical incidents. The Fall 2010 conference focused on 
trying to articulate a coherent model of critical incident analysis and what factors would be 
significant. In the Summer of 2011, the conference’s focus was 9/11 as a critical incident with 
special emphasis on the experiences of children who experienced 9/11 and as such highlighted 
the complexity of critical incidents.  In addition, peer-reviewed articles from the first two issues 
of the Journal of Critical Incident Analysis provided information for the framework.  The table 
below gives a sampling of the Journal of Critical Incident Analysis sources referenced and the 
information collected to help with crafting the framework. 
 
  




Table 1: Select Articles from the Journal for Critical Incident Analysis  
 
Author Source Information Used to Develop 
Framework 
 
Kirby, E. (Fall 2010). A Conceptual Model for Critical Incident 
Analysis. Journal of Critical Incident 
Analysis, 1(1):3-16 
Definition of critical incident; 
Model of critical incident analysis; 
Types of critical incidents 
Till, R. (Fall 2010) Simulation in Interventions Using Agent 
Based Modeling. Journal of Critical 
Incident Analysis, 1(1):17-29 
Definition of critical incident; 
Model of critical incident analysis; 
Actors in critical incident 
Colvin, R. (Fall 2010) Critical Incidents, Invisible Populations, 
and Public Policy: A Case of the LGBT 
Community. Journal of Critical Incident 
Analysis, 1(1):30-40 
Trigger Mechanisms 
Gad-el-Hak, M. (Spring 
2011) 
Large-Scale Disasters: Mechanistic 
Framework for Prediction, Control and 
Mitigation. Journal of Critical Incident 
Analysis, 1(2):105-160 
Call for consideration of natural and 
man-made incidents as dynamical 
systems; Scope of critical incidents 
Coates, D. (Spring 2011) Disaster and Recovery: The Public and 
Private Sectors in the Aftermath of the 1906 
Earthquake in San Francisco. Journal of 
Critical Incident Analysis, 1(2):161-173 
Actors 
 
The paper draws heavily on Hurricane Katrina as a critical incident that can be used to 
explain the model. With over 1,200 dead, more than 1.5 million people directly affected, and 
more than 800,000 displaced, it was the largest forced migration since the Dust Bowl migration 
in the 1930s (DHS, 2008). Additionally, there was over $52 billion in government funds to aid 
recovery efforts, as well as widespread private sector contributions. Hurricane Katrina resulted in 
unprecedented ecological and economic impacts, long term psychological impacts including 
PTSD, and changes in state and federal emergency management laws.  
 
Critical Incidents: Definitions and Models in Use 
 
A critical incident is defined as “a relatively brief occurrence involving injury, loss, 
conflict, discovery or change of significant proportion, usually unscripted and unanticipated, 
with the potential to alter existing societal norms” (Ochberg, et. al., 2007).  
The pivotal elements of this definition are “change of significant proportion”, “alter 
existing social norms” and “unscripted and unanticipated”. Our understanding of critical 
incidents is defined by our experience of and reactions to them (Gill, 2007). A critical incident 
causes society or segments of society to stop and take stock – to reflect upon the incident, 
critically assess the incident, and engage with issues involved in the incident’s occurrence, as 
well as question beliefs, attitudes and behavior (Kirby, 2010). Because there is reflection, large-
scale change usually accompanies critical incidents. Critical incidents can also present significant 
global consequences. For example, the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown that resulted in 
global changes in safety standards for nuclear power plants; the 2004 SE Asian earthquake and 
tsunami that revolutionized early warning systems applications in coastal communities; and 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted to sweeping changes in how we plan and prepare for natural 




disasters as well as fundamental organizational changes to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, and better evacuation planning nationally (Bell, 2006). 
Critical incidents are unanticipated and unexpected and often so improbable that we 
cannot even imagine them until they occur. The examples cited above bear testament to our 
inability to anticipate critical incidents. As a result, it is very difficult to plan for critical 
incidents. What can be done is to learn from them retrospectively and to put plans and 
mechanisms in place to mitigate the circumstances that originally led to negative critical 
incidents, or to facilitate those circumstances that led to positive incidents in the first place. 
Although critical incidents are usually negative and traumatic in cause and consequences, 
they may also lead to positive and uplifting outcomes (Schwester, Dank, & Horning, 2008). In a 
positive manner, a critical incident would be a serendipitous discovery of a new program that 
revolutionizes organizational processes. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s constitutes a 
critical incident that resulted in a positive societal outcome especially for disadvantaged 
segments of the society. In addition, the creation of the World Wide Web is a positive critical 
incident in that it has completely reshaped the way we live and work, interact with each other, 
mobilize around issues, and has generally expanded the reach of information and knowledge in 
ways that could not have been imagined prior to its existence. 
Critical incidents are not the same as natural disasters, although they can result from one 
(Kirby, 2010). The difference lies in the fact that critical incidents tend to follow a more 
nonlinear pattern of development in that it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the disaster’s 
beginning or end (Gill, 2007). Gill (2007) points out that: these events cascade and result in new 
incidents and impacts before they are finally resolved; and that there is a constant stream of new 
information that leads to renewed perceptions of threat. Critical incidents evolve exponentially, 
rather than geometrically. Their impacts quickly reverberate nationally or globally. They are not 
contained at the local level. These points are significant to the study of critical incidents because 
they highlight the fact that there is not a definite outcome, but multiple possible outcomes of one 
critical incident throughout its life. This is so because the incidents take unusual turns from the 
time of initiation (trigger) to stabilization and outcome. We take some time to process the 
evolving streams of information, understand what that information means, and then try to put 
them to use to assist with stabilizing the critical incident.  
Further, because of their scale and unscripted nature, critical incidents are often 
associated with high levels of psychological anxiety and stress. Critical incidents often result in 
significant long term displacement and distress, even for people who do not live in close 
proximity to the event (Freudenburg, 1997). This was true in the case of Three Mile Island in 




Kirby (2010) introduced a conceptual model designed for critical incident analysis based 
on the 2004 work of Ochberg, et al. This model, shown in figure 1, incorporates the event itself, 
the demands the event makes on political actors, the influences of policy on the actions taken by 
the bureaucracy and adhocracy, and the resulting tactics that are fed back into the incident 
(Goodman, 2008). As shown in figure 1, the political arena consists of interactions between the 
governors and the governed based on trust (Till, 2010). The bureaucracy and adhocracy consists 
of management and whatever responsibility they delegate to those who intervene to stabilize a 
critical incident (Till, 2010). Within the model, the media is shown to influence all other 




elements described. The media presents a lens through which the critical incident experience is 
filtered and common understanding formed. The media therefore is a key player in critical 
incident analysis. 
 
Figure 1: A Model for Critical Incident Analysis by Ochberg, Cinti, Goodman, Houk, 
Kirby, Lammers, Melia, Prior, & Taggart (2004). 
 
From this initial model of critical incident analysis one can observe components that 
depict the various interactions that take place during a critical incident. For instance, during an 
incident government intervene both with the citizenry and with the managers and the managers 
interact with the interveners to bring the incident under control. The model in figure 1 presents 
two distinct groups of interactions that take place during a critical incident. Interactions that take 
place as the critical incident is initiated (interactions between violators and target in the red star-
shaped block), and those that occur during response to the critical incident (i.e., those between 
the governors and the governed, governors and the managers, those between managers – 
interactions between the blue box and the green triangle). There are also interactions between all 
three color groups and the media that mediate all these domains during a critical incident. This 
model still leaves a pertinent question unanswered, how do we know how to identify and label an 
incident as a “critical incident?”  
This author proposes that incidents labeled “critical incidents” can be understood using 
the open systems perspective. This perspective originated in biological science but has been 
widely applied in other areas of study in the social sciences including organization theory, chaos 
and complexity, political economy, computer applications, among others.  
 
 




Open Systems Perspective and Its Utility for Critical Incident Analysis  
 
To understand open systems, one must first understand what constitutes a system. A 
system is anything whose component parts are so interrelated and interdependent that any change 
in one, produces simultaneous changes in other components, and as such alters the thing as a 
whole (Tompkins, 2005). Examples of systems include the solar system, a thermostat, global 
economy, the human body, a rainforest, a city, etc. Each of these systems has component parts 
and processes that constitute its structure. Systems involve input and output of materials or 
energy that determine how they function. The various parts have functional and structural 
relationships between them that are nonlinear (Walonick, 1993). Although each component part 
can be analyzed independently, the utility of the systems perspective is that it helps us to 
understand whatever is being studied holistically to give a more accurate picture of how the 
component parts work together as a whole. The fundamental difference between a closed system 
and one that is open is that open systems exchange matter, energy and information with the 
external environment, closed systems do not. 
The open systems perspective focuses on the “external environment and exchanges 
between the system and the environment so that systems can adapt and renew themselves and 
continue to grow or take on different states” (Tompkins, 2005, p. #). Environmental forces shape 
the structure and behavior of the (critical incident) system (Tompkins, 2005). A key 
consideration in the open systems perspective is the maintenance of equilibrium with the external 
environment. If the environment is turbulent, as in the case of critical incidents, then the system 
adapts to deal with rapid change. A calmer environment does not require this type of adaptation. 
Whereas closed systems’ components deteriorate and are completely spent over time, open 
systems renew and reinvigorate themselves through access to resources from the external 
environment (i.e., negative entropy) and gets more complex and heterogeneous over time 
(Tompkins, 2005). Hence, the longer a critical incident continues, the more difficult it is to be 
contained or understood. As the incident evolves there are shifting coalitions of external 
participants contending to keep the critical incident under control through trial and error in most 
cases or to keep the momentum going in the case of positive incidents. It is these interactions that 
determine the outcome of a critical incident. 
Bertalanffy (1968) observed that due to the importation of new resources into the open 
system, the path or outcome of that system is not determined by its initial condition, but by types 
of interactions that take place between components, and also between components and the 
environment. As a result, an open system’s end state can be reached by any of multiple means 
(Bertalanffy, 1968). This principle is known as equifinality. Components within the system 
interact in a non-random and patterned way resulting in not one, but many paths to system 
outcome (Tompkins, 2005). The patterns of interaction in turn, give each system its unique 
identity which can then be studied.   
An important principle of systems functioning is their reliance on continuous feedback 
with their environment (borrowed from the field of cybernetics as articulated by Norbert and 
Wiener, 1940s). In systems there is continuous throughput transformation of input (information, 
material, resources) into output or outcome through a feedback loop (Tompkins, 2005). 
Feedback controls or regulates the system. In the case of critical incidents information, policy 
action, behavioral change, response and other interventions constitute feedback. Systems 
experience both positive and negative feedback. Positive feedback will accelerate any change in 
a system and results in amplification of that change, rather than equilibrium. For example, if a 




boulder is rolling downhill, positive feedback speeds up the downhill roll. In contrast, negative 
feedback reverses the change within the system and moves it to equilibrium. In the case of the 
boulder, the rolling would slow with negative feedback. As a result of feedback, these systems 
are viewed by open systems theorists as self–regulating, adjusting to the requirements of the 
external environment to achieve equilibrium. 
Feedback allows for emergence (outcome) which results when independent parts of the 
system interact because they can no longer act independently, and begin to influence each other 
(Skytner, 2007). It is this relationship that gives the system its properties and behavior (Skytner, 
2007). Because it is not easy to fathom the nuanced relationships that occur within a system, 
Beer (1979) encourages experimentation with a variety of interventions as well as attempts at 
discerning patterns of change, and the effects of those changes within an open system. This 
encouragement is especially applicable for critical incidents that are turbulent in nature.  
The benefits of using the open systems perspective to understand and label critical 
incidents is that open systems allow for an alternative avenue to understand these phenomena 
outside of a simple cause and effect relationship, but rather to understand them in terms of 
simultaneous interactions. Using open systems thinking to develop a framework for critical 
incident analysis allows for the consideration of the dynamic nature of critical incidents. 
Critical incidents operate in an input-process-output (or outcome relationship).  Among 
the input components are the trigger that sets off a critical incident and the activating event that 
pushes the incident into critical mode. Process components are those activities that generally take 
place during the response to a critical incident. Herein lays the complexity of a critical incident. 
There are multiple responders from the community, including individuals responding to 
cascading series of causes and effects (some anticipated; many novel). There are also national 
and even international responders as the incident almost immediately overwhelms the local 
resources to cope with the incident. Each response relies on some other response. Each event 
responded to can potentially trigger other events, some of which are unanticipated (i.e., non-
linear). Outcome components are demands from the governed class or citizens on the governors 
who employ tactics and policies to address the initial trigger, and the results of unfolding. 
Outcomes also involve measures instituted by communities as they understand more about what 
happened and try to improve. They also include changes by individuals, who having learned 
from the critical incident wonder what changes they can make, and later reflect these changes 
into individual actions. For instance, there are many individuals from the Lower 9
th
 Ward in New 
Orleans who now volunteer to monitor the levee system (personal communication, June 12, 
2010). Identifying the various components of a critical incident facilitates analysis. In order to be 
able to properly analyze a phenomenon, one first has to put a boundary around it. Utilizing the 
open systems perspective facilitates this boundary building.  
In addition, ongoing case studies done through the Academy for Critical Incident 
Analysis (e.g., Virginia Tech shootings, Hurricane Katrina, 9/11 terrorist attacks) show other 
commonalities in all critical incidents. For instance, in our study of Hurricane Katrina several 
things were observed. First, there are always triggers to critical incidents -something causes or 
initiates a series of incidents leading to a critical incident – psychological issues with the shooter 
in the case of Virginia Tech; sheer volume of water from the hurricane putting pressure on the 
levee system in New Orleans, lack of preparation on the part of city and state leaders in the case 
of Hurricane Katrina; failure to take credible threats seriously in the case of 9/11, and a lack of 
understanding of terrorism threat prior to 9/11. 




Second, if not properly managed, critical incidents escalate before they are stabilized. 
Improvisation, policy implementation and feedback are required by a network of interveners 
including government and citizens, but also the media, and non-government and private sector 
and individual actors to stabilize critical incidents. Third, critical incidents usually lead to policy 
changes. In the case of those critical incidents with negative outcomes there is greater regulation 
of behavior that are intended to detect and deter the actions that lead to the critical incident in the 
first place. In the case of critical incidents with positive outcomes, there are regulations to 
facilitate actions that resulted in that critical incident. Critical incidents usually lead to behavioral 
changes because of lessons learned.  
The framework proposed in this paper highlights not only the input and process 
components, but also outcome components thereby presenting a more holistic way of studying 
and understanding critical incidents. The framework integrates a feedback loop to show the 
dynamic nature of critical incidents; they interact and exchange energy, information and 
resources with the environment, thus allowing critical incidents to be characterized as open 
systems.  
 
Using the Open Systems Model to Develop a Framework for Critical Incident Analysis  
 
What would a framework that is generic enough to encapsulate the essential components 
observed in all critical incidents look like?  Figure 2 presents a critical incident as an open 
system that includes several interrelated components linked together in an input-process-outcome 
relationship informed and regulated by continuous feedback. The thick broken line around the 
components delineates the “critical incident.” The activating event, responses and interventions, 
lessons and fundamental change leading to transformational changes in policy outcomes, 
community outcomes, and societal outcomes constitute the critical incident. Critical incidents do 
not lead to incremental change which results in that being outside the critical incident box. 





































Table 2 shows that the components involved in a typical critical incident can be grouped 
together into four distinct sets of components – (1) input components, (2) process components, 
(3) outcome components and (4) a feedback component. Also in the table in italics are the 
components depicted in the proposed framework in figure 2 as follows: 
 










- Social (Human) 
 
Activating Event 
Responses or Interventions 
- Multiple causes and effects 
- Novel, intense, and    
  changing circumstances 













Key Elements of the Framework 
 
Input Components 
Input components are changes to the system that modify process components. Inputs are 
detectable changes in the critical incident environment that influence other activities in that 
environment. These components are described below: 
 
Trigger 
A trigger is the originating cause of an event or set of circumstances that result in a 
critical incident (Freudenburg, 1997). This could be a result of natural, technological, or human 
actions. Whether outcomes are negative or positive, triggers constitute the underlying 
instabilities that lead to a critical incident.  In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the trigger was the 
sheer volume of water dumped by the hurricane. The water quickly inundated the levee system 
and led to its breach in several places.  
 
Activating Event 
An activating event is the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000) in a set of instabilities in the 
environment. An activating event is that point at which the trigger reaches critical mass, the 
boiling point in a set of instabilities in the environment, the point at which a trigger cascades into 
a rapidly changing set of circumstances that compels the actors to pay close attention to the 
rapidly changing and increasing scale of a situation. The levee breach during Hurricane Katrina 
was the activating event. The breach resulted in the flooding of the city of New Orleans, water 
contamination and the ultimate demise of over 1,200 people and property damage in the billions 
of dollars. This case is discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow. 
 
Process Components  
Process components are the set of actions that convert inputs into outcomes. Process 
components are transformative components. While process components are present in all critical 




incidents, the interventions taken, actions and events that trigger new effects, policies brought to 
bear, actors, the way the community and individuals understand and react, and lessons are 
different in human, technological and natural incidents. The responses to critical incidents 
usually include novel approaches because the circumstances themselves are atypical or 
improbable. 
 
Responses or Interventions 
Interventions are actions taken to correct or ameliorate the impact/results of the activating 
event and its consequences. This action is taken by government (federal, state, local), NGOs, 
private sector agencies, communities and individuals. Because of the scale and the novelty of 
critical incidents, there are often international actors as well contributing technical expertise and 
unique resources and skills to the cause. Hurricane Katrina showed this argument to be true. 
Hurricane Katrina’s costs outpaced those typically associated with a hurricane (Waugh & 
Tierney, 2009) – countries from Afghanistan to Yemen offered assistance of one kind or another. 
The Netherlands for instance sent dyke inspection teams, Germany sent water treatment 
specialists, China sent medical experts, the United Nations deployed experts from the High 
Commission for Refugees as well as those from the World Health Organization (CNN, 2005). In 
addition, whereas in normal disasters residents are evacuated within their home states, Hurricane 
Katrina evacuees were spread throughout the country – the volume of evacuees would 
overwhelm individual states and so had to be shared. 
Moreover, an assessment of the timeline of response activities to Hurricane Katrina 
indicates that each response relies on some other response; that unanticipated events are an 
integral part of each critical incident, and that each event responded to can potentially trigger 
other events, most of which are unanticipated.  
 
Timeline 
On Sunday, August 28, 2005 at around 9:00 am New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issues a 
mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans on advice from National Hurricane Center Director 
Max Mayfield that category four storm Katrina heads for New Orleans (Drye, 2005; DeLozier, 
2005). National Hurricane Center warns that the storm is potentially catastrophic indicating that 
some levees in the greater New Orleans Area could overflow their banks resulting in significant 
storm surge flooding (Drye, 2005); therefore residents in low lying areas are encouraged to 
evacuate. The Superdome and nine other shelters open to allow people in (DeLozier, 2005). Late 
Sunday night thousands of New Orleans residents were either unable to leave or chose not to 
(Drye, 2005). By noon on Sunday August 28, highways are packed, and the city activates contra-
flow traffic system to allow for outgoing traffic only (DeLozier, 2005).  
By 8:00 am on Monday, August 29, 2005 Mayor Nagin reports that the New Orleans 
levees have been breached and that water was flowing over the levees. By 11:00 am a major 
levee has failed in New Orleans dumping water through the 17
th
 Street Canal; the city of New 
Orleans begins to flood (Drye, 2005). Throughout the day water continues to pour into New 
Orleans from breaches in the city’s levees. The Superdome sustains damage to the roof and other 
areas of the building with about 10,000 people inside and the National Guard is called in 
(DeLozier, 2005). The breach was the point at which the trigger reaches critical mass, the boiling 
point in a set of instabilities in the environment. It is the point at which a trigger cascades into a 
rapidly changing set of circumstances that compels the important actors to pay close attention to 
a changing situation. 




On Tuesday August 30, about 80% of New Orleans is covered in water; 20 feet in some 
places (Drye, 2005). FEMA stops volunteer firefighters with emergency experience from 
entering the city due to the insecurity of the city (DeLozier). There is an official call for anyone 
with boats to help in the rescue operation. The mayor announces that the city’s pumps will fail 
by sheer volume and intensity of the water flowing into the city. Reports suggest widespread 
looting (DeLozier, 2005; Drye, 2005). 
Wednesday August 31, Governor Blanco orders remaining residents in New Orleans to 
leave the city; however, there are no buses and trucks to carry out that order (Drye, 2005). Health 
and Human Services secretary declares federal health emergency throughout the Gulf Coast and 
sends in medical supplies and workers (DeLozier, 2005). Health related problems beginning to 
surface as a result of water-borne diseases, environmental pollution from chemicals, lead from 
petroleum, household pesticides and sewage mix in the cities (Shah, 2005). Buses start to arrive 
to evacuate about 25, 000 from the Superdome; 52,000 are in Red Cross shelters. By midday the 
water stops rising in New Orleans. Looting grows exponentially and the police are forced to 
focus on violence, looting, and carjacking rather than search and rescue (DeLozier, 2005). 
FEMA water rescue operations suspended because of gun fire (Drye, 2005; DeLozier, 2005). At 
the same time there is a breach in the London Avenue canal. 
Thursday September 1, New Orleans mayor issues desperate SOS to federal government 
for help (e.g., no food for those seeking shelter in the Louisiana Superdome and the New Orleans 
Convention Center) (Drye, 2005). The New Orleans Convention Center was never listed in the 
New Orleans Comprehensive Response Plan as a shelter before its use. On September 2, the U.S. 
National Guard along with supply trucks arrives in New Orleans; Congress returns from recess, 
approves and President Bush signs a $10.5 billion in aid bill (Drye, 2005; DeLozier 2005). 
Friday September 2, President Bush tours the area and acknowledges the government’s failure; 
more national guardsmen deployed to New Orleans. U.S and Europe tap oil and gas reserves as 
gas prices soar to approximately $3.00 per gallon because of refinery damage (DeLozier, 2005; 
CNN, 2005). There are explosions at chemical storage plant in New Orleans with resulting 
scattered fires (DeLozier, 2005). On Saturday September 2, 200 officers walk off the job in the 
New Orleans police force; two commit suicide. U.S. Labor Department announces $62 million in 
emergency grants for displaced workers. On September 4, Louisiana Governor Blanco declares 
state of public health emergency. Monday September 5, most of the gaps in levees closed; 500 
New Orleans officers unaccounted for, some refiners restart production. Tuesday, September 6, 
less than 10,000 people still remained in New Orleans (Drye, 2005; DeLozier, 2005). Thursday 
September 8, $52 billion in aid approved by Congress to complement $10.5 billion already 
approved (DeLozier, 2005). 
Hurricane Katrina also presented lasting environmental and psychological impacts. For 
instance Nina Shen Rastogi (2010) noted the high levels of toxicity five years after Hurricane 
Katrina, while psychologist Matthew Tull (2009) observed the increased severity of post-
traumatic stress disorder in those who experienced the event, particularly among those with pre-
existing psychiatric disorder. For these individuals there was greater risk of trauma from the 
event and from watching coverage of the event. 
The timeline of events shows the complexity of critical incidents, their non-linearity, and 
their ability to quickly overwhelm the local, and sometimes even national, ability to cope. The 
timeline helps to validate the notion of equifinality articulated in the open systems perspective 
and also shows the influence that environmental factors pose for open systems.  
 





In this context, governance systems are mediating government or organizational 
mechanisms (local, national and international), as well as individuals (including volunteers) that 
respond to critical incidents. They comprise government offices and field offices at various 
levels of governance, organizations involved in service provision, or responsible for the event or 
circumstances leading to the critical incident, and non-governmental actors involved within the 
policy area of the critical incident. In the Ochberg et al. (2007) model of critical incident analysis 
(see figure 1), governance system specifically refer to government and its interaction with the 
governed.  It is government that directs interventions to sort out or mitigate critical incidents.  
However, within the framework presented in this paper, governance must be understood in a 
wider context.  
The idea of a government standing above society steering it has long been debunked by 
those who study networks and governance structures. These scholars (e.g., Agranoff & McGuire, 
2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; O’Toole & Meier, 2004) argue 
that governments, becoming aware of their limitations and the limitations of downstream 
implementation, have strategically retreated from their “public domain through privatization, 
deregulation, and decentralization strategies” (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1999). This 
argument has articulated what many had known for a while – the conventional view of 
governance with government steering from above was no longer relevant and had given way to a 
new governance paradigm. In this new paradigm there are self-steering mechanisms that ensured 
the smooth execution of policy by all kinds of actors involved in governance, not just 
government (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1999). 
In critical incidents, there are diverse networks of actors involved in each stage of a 
critical incident, including those that remain engaged long after the critical incident has 
stabilized. Government agencies at various levels, private organizations including suppliers and 
contractors, citizens and voluntary groups, hospital and allied healthcare facilities, psychiatric 
services, and the media, among others, comprise the bulk of these actors involved in governance. 
 
Community Rationalization 
How the community comes to grips with the critical incident, the way they process the 
information and experiences, and the measures put in place to limit, in the case of negative 
outcomes, or encourage in the case of positive outcomes, the recurrence of similar events in the 
future at the community level are termed community rationalizing. Community rationalizing 
includes, but is not limited to, a collective sorting through of what happened and how to limit or 
encourage future recurrence. 
The community includes the immediate community impacted, or it can involve a wider 
community such as a country, region, or the globe depending on the scale of the event and the 
number of people who are witness to the event. The 2008 global economic meltdown is one such 
example, although it started in the USA, it had implications for almost every citizen of the globe 
as to whether they were employed or not, government instituted austerity measures, and their 
overall personal lifestyle. The civil rights movement of the 1960s had far reaching impact: 
nationally in terms of who could access loans, what communities minorities could live in, what 
colleges minorities could attend, what social services could be accessed, minority representation 
in sporting events, government and so on. The movement also influenced those in other parts of 
the world who sought to redress civil injustices. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown 
changed not only nuclear safety regulations for power stations, but also changed how we plan for 




possible meltdowns both in the USA and globally. No one was spared the images of these events, 
the constant commentary and expert analyses or the findings of technical panels on the issues.  
These are key influences on how individuals understand and respond to critical incidents. 
 
Learning 
Learning is a key component in critical incident analysis because of its importance in 
stabilizing a critical incident and to impact recurrence of the event. It is a continuous and 
ongoing process of capturing information, processing it and making decisions based on the 
information and knowledge garnered. Learning is the feedback that regulates the critical incident 
(open system) – it informs change and also helps us to codify knowledge.  
 
Feedback 
Feedback is the interactions of the various components of the system because they can no 
longer act independently. When they interact they start to influence each other (Skytner, 2007). It 
is this relationship that gives the system its properties and behavior. In this framework, lessons 
learned constitute the feedback loop. Lessons are learned throughout the critical incident. Some 
lessons are quickly applied, but others must be codified, and applied in planning and strategies 
for coping. These lessons influence policy, strategies for planning and response, risk reduction, 
individual behavior and so on. 
 
Outcome Components 
Outcome components can be observed and measured over the short, medium and long 
term from system interaction after the critical incident has occurred. Outcome components in the 
case of Hurricane Katrina include changes in policies in FEMA, changes in levee construction 
codes, changes in behavior of citizens in response to evacuation orders and changes in 
regulations, and so on. Outcome is used in this paper as opposed to output because output is 
more immediate. The outcomes of critical incidents are not necessarily immediately observed, 
they can arise over the medium to long term. 
 
Change 
Due to the scale, complexity, novelty and visibility of critical incidents, they are 
accompanied by change. The changes are profound or transformational and can be observed at 
multiple levels and at varying degrees.  
 
Policy Change 
Policy change usually follows a critical incident. Transformational change indicate new 
and sweeping legislation and regulations to affect actions that lead to the critical incident, 
significant increase or decrease in budgetary allocations, creation of new agencies organizational 
change, and so on.  
A number of policy changes were initiated and passed based on lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina. The Department of Homeland Security (2008) outlined a few acts that apply 
to future federal emergency actions and also have implications for state emergency actions. They 
include: Title VI of P.L. 109-295 (H.R. 5441) the post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act 2006; Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2005 (SAFE Port Act); Pet Evacuation 
and Transportation Standards Act 2006; Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act 
2006; Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act 2005; and John Warner National Defense 




Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Of these statutes, the Post-Katrina Reform Act is notable 
for its long-term consequences for FEMA and other federal entities (DHS, 2008). According to 
the 2006 CRS report, the Act “reorganizes FEMA, expands its statutory authority, it imposes 
new conditions and requirements on the operations of the agency” (CRS, 2006). A number of 
emergency management functions were consolidated within FEMA, its status was elevated 
within the department, and was granted enhanced organizational autonomy. FEMA’s Office of 
Gulf Coast Recovery was also set up as a result of Katrina. 
 
Behavioral Change 
 Behavioral changes occur after a critical incident. For example, in the case of Hurricane 
Katrina, complex computer models created by scientists and engineers from Louisiana State 
University as well as studies carried out by scholars at the University of California at Berkeley 
show that “faulty design, inadequate construction or some combination of the two were the likely 
cause of the breaches to the levee system in New Orleans (Grunwald & Glasser, 2005, A1). 
Grunwald and Glasser (2005) note that: based on a national discussion of Flood Plain protection 
that ensued post Hurricane Katrina there is now routine maintenance of the flood plains; and, the 
Army Corps of Engineers has instituted a number of organizational changes to minimize the 
chance of levee breach after massive flooding. For instance maintenance practices, technology, 
frequency and process of monitoring, and the organization of those stakeholders focusing on the 
Louisiana levee system have improved. Prior to Hurricane Katrina communities around the 
country were negligent in terms of their preparedness for critical incidents (Bell, 2006).  
 
Other Changes 
Locally in New Orleans and around the country, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the role of 
mutual aid (Bell, 2006). Bell notes that approximately 38 states and 66,000 people responded to 
the incident. There is now a large New Orleans diaspora. People who had never left the 
community, let alone the state were uprooted, leaving family ties, cultural ties, church and other 
social fabric affiliation.  
In addition, there is a large volunteer contingent of remaining residents in New Orleans 
who are active in monitoring the levees and in holding accountable those whose job it is to 
maintain the levee system. 
Nationally, Hurricane Irene in 2011 illustrated how seriously people take the threat of a 
pending hazard and the importance they place on preparation and on heeding evacuation orders. 
Days prior to Irene’s impact, all along the Eastern Seaboard emergency plans were put into 
effect, and there were mandatory evacuation orders. Some cities enforced state of emergency to 
ensure law and order were maintained and shelters were set up. These types of preparedness 
plans bear testament to the institution of lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina.  
When the right lessons are learned there is sweeping or transformational change at one or 
multiple levels. When lessons are partially learned, only incremental changes are made. 
 
Application of the Model 
  
This section provides insights on how scholars and researchers wishing to test the model 
may do so. To reiterate, open systems framework is proposed as a tool for evaluating what 
incidents are critical incidents – how do we delineate and understand them. It is hoped that these 
steps to the model’s application will help other scholars wanting to test the framework and fine 




tune it over time. This approach has been used by scholars in the past to guide the application of 
a proposed framework. For instance, Margaret Polski and Nobel-laureate Elenor Ostrom (1999) 
used this approach when they developed the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
(IAD), 
A number of steps should be considered in the application of the proposed framework. 
The steps are as follows: 
 
Step one: Define what is meant by critical incident. 
The definition-in-use of a critical incident is very broad and leaves a lot to interpretation. This 
provides the flexibility to categorize incidents as they occur. Recall that critical incidents are 
unscripted and unanticipated. As such, the definition should not be so rigid as to box in 
researchers and other scholars who in the future need to identify and analyze critical incidents. 
 
Step two: Identify the trigger and the activating event. 
There are multiple triggers of critical incidents. Triggers may be natural, technological or 
human (social). The activating event is usually different from the trigger and can be the result of 
anything, but it is a specific point in time (i.e., a pivotal moment). Identifying the trigger and the 
activating event will help with the classification of the critical incident. 
 
Step three: Identify and analyze the cause-and effect chains throughout the critical incident, but 
especially in the interventions (Response stage).  
One method that can help with this analysis is the Fishbone analysis that provides a 
structured way of effects and the causes that lead to these effects (Gupta, 2010). First, note the 
types of interventions. Second, label these interventions as either “novel” or “routine” and “large 
scale” or “small scale”. This will assist to differentiate the incident from an ordinary disaster. 
Descriptions placed on the incidents by the media and experts will aid this determination. 
Critical incidents display no-linear patterns because of the multiple and varying causes and 
effects throughout the individual critical incident. These causes and consequences in turn 
influence outcome(s). 
 
Step four: Identify, evaluate and label the impacts. 
Secondary research, such as content analyses and interviews, will aid with this activity. 
Superlatives used in these descriptions are a good indicator of the nature of an incident – critical 
incident or routine event. In addition, estimates of destruction, social impacts, deaths, and so on 
will provide a good picture of impacts. Note that multiple primary and secondary impacts will be 
observed nationally and internationally. 
 
Step five: Analyze what feedback mechanisms apply. 
In social systems like critical incidents, learning is a good indicator of a feedback 
mechanism because one is able to see its expression in the changes that take place. Note that 
changes take place at multiple levels. This means that we must first define what is meant by 
learning and then deconstruct the multiple levels and meanings. 
 
Step six: Determine outcomes. 
Analyze national and local policy outcomes, community and local outcomes, and global 
outcomes separately. These include changes in value systems, sweeping policy overhauls, and 




changes in community norms. These activities present a challenge because of our ability to 
quantify changes such as value system changes but are a critical step in delineating a critical 
incident. However, carefully defining what each change means will greatly aid this process. Note 
that multiple primary and secondary outcomes will be observed locally, nationally and 
internationally. Because they are usually not readily evident, it might be difficult to delineate 
secondary outcomes of a critical incident. 
 
Step seven: Determine the level of the analysis to be done. 
An important consideration is at what level – local, national, international – can the 
framework be applied. The cases relied on as examples all took place in a local context (all 
incidents are local); however, the scale and unprecedented nature soon gave them national and 
international significance. For the sake of analysis, one must be able to put a boundary around a 
critical incident. This is easier done at the national as opposed to the global level because 
impacts and outcomes become unwieldy and difficult to associate with a particular critical 
incident.  Within that level there are multiple units of analysis – who are the actors and their 
relationships throughout the critical incident (See Till, 2010) – responders and types of 
responses, resource needs and suppliers, impacts, and types of change that resulted.  
There are collaborative strategies that could allow for critical incident analysis at a global 
level, for instance multiple case study analysis (see Tellis, 1997; Yin 1994, 2009). Multiple case 




The open systems perspective presents a dynamic framework that encapsulates the 
essential components that can be observed in all critical incidents. The open system perspective 
facilitates a more holistic understanding of critical incidents and will therefore facilitate a more 
complete understanding of critical incidents. 
More specifically, there are several benefits of using the open systems perspective to 
propose a framework for critical incidents. First, it allows an alternative avenue to understand 
this phenomenon outside a static cause-and-effect relationship.  Open systems thinking allows us 
to see simultaneous patterns of interactions, rather than limiting us to sequential interactions that 
cause-and-effect models permit. Because one can observe simultaneous interactions, one can 
also observe the non-linear patterns of relationships that occur in critical incidents. Open systems 
perspective also helps us to see that not all relationships involved in critical incidents are 
proportional in that a small trigger can have tremendous consequences and vice versa.  
Second, unlike static models that only allow us to study critical incident components in 
discrete segments, those utilizing systems thinking allow us to study them together, thus 
affording insights into their nuances of the relationships and interdependencies as the critical 
incident progresses.  
Third, open systems perspective allows us to understand that a critical incident’s end state 
can be reached by any of multiple means (Bertalanffy, 1968) because components within the 
system interact in a non-random and patterned way. This interaction results in not one, but many 
paths system outcome (Tompkins, 2005). As such, one needs to tackle critical incidents on 
multiple strategic fronts using multiple interventions and with multiple actors.  
Fourth, because of the unscripted and unanticipated nature of critical incidents, learning 
lessons as the critical incident unfolds is important. How one applies what one learns impacts the 




outcome of the critical incident system in the short and medium term. Learning and applying 
lessons will also reduce the likelihood of negative outcome or increase the likelihood of positive 
outcomes as a result of similar activating events in the future. It is therefore important to capture 
important lessons, document them, incorporate lessons learned in policies and programs to 
understand and benefit from critical incidents.  
The proposed framework has the potential to aid our understanding of critical incidents. 
This framework must now be tested and refined. The steps proposed to the framework’s 
application are tentative, and many of the steps can be applied simultaneously rather than 
sequentially. These steps can be refined over time. Refinement, as Sabatier (1999) reminds us, 
will facilitate the development of a clear and logically coherent and interrelated set of 
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